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ABSTRACT 
 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF FUNDS FROM 
OPERATIONS (FFO) USING POLYNOMIAL REGRESSION AND RESPONSE SURFACE 
METHODOLOGY 
 
By 
FRANK GYAMFI-YEBOAH 
 
JULY 22, 2010 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Alan Ziobrowski 
 
Major Department: Real Estate 
 
I examine the market reaction to the announcement of FFO by REITs using abnormal trading 
volume as a gauge of investors’ reaction. I also address the question of whether FFO provides 
more useful information to investors than net income. Lastly, I examine whether the quality of 
private information among traders prior to the announcement of FFO affects the level of 
abnormal trading volume. 
 
Using three different specifications, I find that even though the announcement of FFO leads to 
abnormal trading, there is no association between the level of abnormal trading volume and the 
size of the surprise contained in the FFO announcement. I also find, using abnormal returns as a 
xii 
 
measure of investor response, that FFO explains significantly more variance in abnormal returns 
than net income suggesting that FFO provides more useful information than net income. 
 
Lastly, I use the proportion of institutional holdings as a proxy for the number of informed 
traders to predict the amount of abnormal trading volume. I find no significant relation between 
abnormal trading volume and the proportion of institutional holdings. However, when I break 
down institutional ownership into two broad classifications, I find that the level of abnormal 
trading volume is significantly positively related to the holdings by mutual funds and investment 
advisors but negatively related to the holdings of other institutions (pension funds 
&.endowments, banks and insurance companies). This raises questions of whether the use of an 
aggregate measure of institutional ownership is appropriate in studies that examine the effect of 
institutional holdings. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Background 
Finance and Accounting theories suggest investors use earnings information in the valuation of 
stocks. Most of the valuation models assert that the value of stock should relate to its earnings 
capacity. It is, therefore, no surprise that earnings information remains highly sought after by 
investors. As a consequence, researchers have, over the past four decades, hypothesized a strong 
relationship between earnings and stock prices. The results from such studies, however, often 
show a weak relationship. 
 
The fundamental question addressed in a majority of the past studies is whether a significant 
relationship exists between the announcement of unexpected earnings and any observed 
abnormal returns around the announcement date. The premise of this question is that if financial 
markets are efficient and earnings information is indeed central to the pricing of stocks, then the 
announcement of unexpected earnings should lead to stock repricing. The apparent disconnect 
between the strong relationship posited in most studies and the weak empirical relationship 
observed between unexpected earnings announcements and abnormal returns remains a puzzle. 
 
A number of explanations have emerged to explain the weak empirical relationship including the 
possibility of a misspecification of the equation estimating the returns/earnings relationship.  
Much of the effort at improving the specification has focused on either using alternative earning 
metrics such as net income or using a non-linear specification. Notwithstanding these attempts, 
the reported relationship between earnings and returns remains weak. 
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A related question is whether the relation between stock price changes and unexpected earnings 
captures only some aspects of investors’ reaction to the information content of earnings 
announcements. Lev (1989) argues that “stock price change is, of course, a restricted indicator of 
information usefulness, since in a heterogeneous belief setting; investors might use the 
information without the price being changed”. This line of reasoning suggests that other 
indicators of investors’ behavior such as volume of trading may reflect more fully the reaction of 
investors to the announcement of unexpected earnings. A number of studies including Bamber 
(1986), Atiase and Bamber (1994) and Utama and Cready (1997) have used trading volume to 
assess the information content of EPS and documented significant market reaction following 
earnings announcement.  
 
The peculiar nature of real estate investment trusts (REITs) necessitated the introduction of 
additional performance metrics in addition to the traditional earnings per share (EPS) metric used 
for industrial stocks. Although the most widely publicized metric in the REIT industry is funds 
from operations (FFO), legitimate questions have been raised as to whether FFO provides 
superior information to investors compared to other metrics such as net income. It has, for 
instance, been argued that since FFO is unaudited it may be subject to manipulation by 
management. Such a possibility can raise serious doubts about its credibility in investors’ minds. 
Fields, Rangan and Thiagarajan (1998) document evidence that suggests FFO may not 
necessarily be more useful than net income and find that the superiority of one over the other is 
highly contextual. In a similar study, Gore and Stott (1998) conclude that although FFO appeared 
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to be relatively more informative than net income, the difference in the usefulness between the 
two measures was not statistically significant.  
 
Most previous research uses a difference score (expected FFO minus actual FFO) as a proxy for 
unexpected FFO in regression analyses to predict abnormal returns or abnormal trading volume. 
However, in a recent study by Gyamfi-Yeboah, Ziobrowski and Lambert (2009), this approach is 
shown to be misspecified. The authors present an alternative approach that uses expected and 
actual FFO as separate variables and includes their interaction and higher order terms in the 
analysis. They test the constraints imposed by the traditional specifications and find that the 
constraints are not empirically supported.   
 
Using this approach, I examine the information content of FFO with specific emphasis on the 
strength of the relationship between unexpected FFO announcements and abnormal trading 
volume around the announcement dates. Also, I assess the information content of net income and 
address the question of whether FFO offers greater information content to investors than net 
income.  
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Objectives of the Dissertation 
My main objective in this dissertation is to examine the information content of FFO to investors 
using a polynomial regression and response surface methodology, an approach that addresses the 
problems associated with earlier studies such as constrained relationships. Specifically, I seek 
answers to the following questions: 
• Is the announcement of unexpected FFO followed by abnormal trading? 
o Is the abnormal trading stronger for positive or negative surprises? 
• Does a difference in the quality of private information among traders prior to the 
announcement of FFO affect the level of abnormal trading volume? 
• Is FFO more informative to investors than net income? 
 
Contribution of the Dissertation 
I extend the literature in several significant ways. First, I apply an alternative approach, 
polynomial regression and response surface methodology, to examine the information content of 
FFO. This approach, unlike those used in prior studies, does not collapse the conceptually 
distinct variables that make up unexpected FFO (i.e. expected and actual FFO) into a single 
construct. Rather, it uses them as separate independent variables in addition to the interaction and 
higher order terms. It must be stressed that collapsing actual and expected FFO into a single 
measure (a difference score) implies the implausible assumption that the market reacts the 
similarly to a situation where actual FFO exceeds expected FFO (a positive surprise) as it does 
when actual FFO is less than expected (a negative surprise). Difference score approaches, which 
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have been widely adopted in the literature, are prone to serious methodological issues (See 
Cronbach (1958), Edwards (2001) and Edwards (2002),). These issues include reducing a three-
dimensional relationship into two dimensions and imposing untested restrictions on 
relationships. Polynomial regression, on the other hand, provides an opportunity for the 
constraints imposed by difference scores to be tested empirically and presents the relationship 
between the variables in three dimensions. 
 
My second contribution to the literature is to test Kim and Verrecchia’s (1991) hypothesis that 
when there is a differential in the precision of private information held by traders, the 
announcement of new information will cause “differential belief revision” among the traders and 
lead to abnormal trading volume. The authors note that “relatively better informed traders revise 
their beliefs less because the new information is relatively less important to them than to those 
who are more poorly informed”.  In other words, the level of abnormal trading following the 
announcement of unexpected FFO will be less for REITs with more informed investors prior to 
the announcement. To test this hypothesis, I follow Kim, Krinsky and Lee (1997) and Utama and 
Cready (1997) and use the level of institutional ownership as a proxy for the extent of the 
differential in the quality of private information among traders. I argue that institutional investors 
are less likely to differ in the precision of their privately held information than individual 
investors. Thus, REITs with higher levels of institutional ownership are more likely to have 
lower levels of abnormal trading. In contrast to the predictions above, Kim, Krinsky and Lee 
(1997) examine the relationship between abnormal trading volume and institutional ownership 
and suggest a strong positive relationship. However, Utama and Cready (1997) show that the 
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relationship between trading volume and the level of institutional ownership is quadratic and that 
this relationship is negative when institutional ownership is high. Since the early 1990s, REITs 
have, on average, tended to have higher concentrations of institutional ownership than other 
stocks (Chan, Leung and Wang, 1998). Also, the REIT operating environment differs from other 
firms due to high transaction costs and lower information production (Devos, Ong, and Spieler 
(2007) and Downs and Guner (1999)). Furthermore, Downs and Guner (1999) find that the 
information flow in the real estate securities market may be as deficient as in the underlying real 
estate asset. As a result, private informational advantage among REIT investors might be more 
pronounced than among industrial stock investors. The characteristics of REITs and their unique 
operating environment provide a good setting to test Kim and Verrecchia’s (1991) hypothesis. 
 
Finally, I explore the question of whether FFO is more useful to investors than net income within 
the context of how investors react to the unexpected announcement of the two performance 
metrics. Fields, Rangan and Thiagarajan (1998) assess the usefulness of FFO and net income by 
analyzing the association of FFO and net income with operating cash flow and current stock 
prices. However, similar to Gore and Stott (1998), I examine the relative usefulness of the two 
measures by exploring how investors react to the announcement of either unexpected FFO or net 
income. It is important to stress that the sample used by Gore and Stott (1998) covered the period 
from 1991 to 1996, prior to the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts’ 
(NAREIT) major review of the calculation of FFO in 2000, which was aimed at improving its 
uniformity and reliability. Baik, Billings and Morton (2008) document evidence that suggests the 
information content of FFO increased after 2000. These authors do not address the question of 
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whether FFO has become more useful than net income following the changes NAREIT 
introduced in 2000.   
 
Scope of the Dissertation  
The majority of the empirical work examining the relation between earnings and returns has 
focused on assessing the information content of GAAP earnings metrics; particularly earnings 
per share (EPS). The introduction of a non-GAAP metric such as FFO by NAREIT in 1991 for 
the REIT industry provides a natural extension to the earnings/returns research. The primary 
question addressed in these studies is the extent to which new measures such as FFO are useful 
to investors. A number of studies (Gore and Tott (1998); Graham and Knight (2000); Stunda and 
Typpo (2004); Baik, Billings and Morton (2008)) have addressed this question in the context of 
the REIT industry. But as noted already, the approach adopted in all of these studies suffers from 
serious methodological issues, which may mask the relationship between FFO and returns. Using 
polynomial regression and response surface analysis, which place no constraints on these 
relationships, this study examines the information content of FFO by carrying out two 
interconnected empirical investigations. 
 
First, I examine the information content of FFO by assessing the strength of the relationship 
between unexpected FFO and abnormal trading around the announcement date. I choose to use 
abnormal trading for two reasons; first, trading volume is more likely to reflect more fully the 
reaction of investors to FFO announcements and therefore has the potential to provide more 
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insights regarding the usefulness of FFO to investors. Second, using trading volume allows for 
the test of Kim and Verrecchia’s (1991) hypothesis which states that the level of abnormal 
trading following the announcement of an unexpected FFO will be less for REITs with more 
informed investors 
 
Secondly, I examine whether FFO is more useful to investors than alternative measures such as 
net income. Although, this issue has previously been addressed in the literature, there are still a 
number of unresolved questions. Neither Fields et. al (1998), Vincent (1999) nor Gore and Stott 
(1998) provide definite conclusion on the superiority of FFO over net income. Also, NAREIT’s 
decision to revise the definition of FFO and provide more clarity in 2000 may have altered 
investors’ views of the two metrics. Therefore, addressing the question in a post-2000 period has 
the potential to provide new insights. 
 
I limit this study to equity REITs, defined as REITs that invest in income-producing real estate 
and derive at least 75% of their revenues from such properties. I focus on equity REITs because 
depreciation, which is one of the most significant items excluded in the calculation of FFO, is 
unlikely to be substantial for Mortgage or Hybrid REITs. As a result, I expect the difference in 
investors’ perception of FFO versus net income to be more pronounced in equity REITs than 
either mortgage or hybrid REITs.   
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Organization of the Dissertation 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. The next chapter reviews the relevant literature. 
Chapter 3 describes the data and presents the methodology while chapter 4 presents the results. 
Chapter 5 concludes the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter presents a review of the extant literature. The first part discusses studies that have 
examined the relationship between earnings and returns. The second part reviews studies that 
have focused on examining the information content of earnings but within the context of how 
trading volume responds to unexpected earnings announcements. The third and fourth sections 
present the background of FFO and studies that have examined the information content of FFO, 
respectively, while hypotheses are presented in the last section.  
 
The Returns/Earnings Research 
The research assessing the information content of earnings is extensive and dates back to the 
pioneering work of Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968). Most of this research centers on 
the extent to which earnings metrics produced by the accounting profession are useful to 
investors and also to test the efficient market hypothesis. Much of the research prior to the 1990s 
focused on measurement issues for both return and earnings. On the return side, Haggerman, 
Zmijewski and Shah (1984), Wilson (1986), and Bowen and Daley (1987) use abnormal returns 
as a proxy for the return variable, while Beaver, Lambert and Ryan (1987) and Jacobson (1987) 
use raw returns. Measures for the earnings variable include earnings per share (EPS) 
(Haggerman et al, 1984; Hopwood and McKeown, 1985; Lipe, 1986; Hughes and Ricks, 1987) 
and net income (Beaver, Griffin and Landsman, 1982). Despite some use of alternative measures 
in previous studies, the use of residual returns and EPS is dominant in the literature.  
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Lev (1989) reviews and summarizes the findings of research focused on assessing the usefulness 
of earnings over the period 1980 – 1988. The major finding of this review is that the correlation 
between earnings and stock returns is low and the nature of the returns/earnings relationship was 
unstable over time. The small variance in returns explained by earnings is also relatively 
insensitive to the choice of the length of the return window. For instance, for windows of 2 to 5 
days, the variance in abnormal returns explained by unexpected earnings ranged from 2% to 5% 
and for windows of 3 months to 2 years unexpected earnings explained only 4% to 7% of the 
variance in abnormal return.  Lev (1989) identifies a number of reasons that might explain the 
lack of a strong relation between earnings and returns and suggests a possible misspecifiation of 
the returns/earnings equation. 
 
Cheng, Hopwood and McKeown (1992) examine the specification of the cross-sectional, 
ordinary least square models and find that severe specification problems exist in the linear 
regression models. Specifically, they find the most pronounced misspecification problem to be 
the assumption of linearity. Although Cheng et al reject the linear specifications used in prior 
research, they provide little guidance on alternative models that might allow for curvilinear 
relationships or would address the problems associated with traditional approaches. Freeman and 
Tse (1992) also argue that “transitory earnings surprises should have less impact on security 
prices than permanent earnings surprises”. This line of reasoning also suggests that the 
returns/earnings relationship is curvilinear. Even though Cheng et al (1992) and Freeman and 
Tse (1992) provide a strong case to re-examine the specification of the returns/earnings 
relationship, subsequent research continued to use linear models and a difference score (actual 
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earnings minus expected earnings) to predict abnormal returns.  In a recent study, Gyamfi-
Yeboah et al (2009) adopt an alternative specification with REIT returns using expected and 
actual FFO as separate variables and include interaction and higher order terms to test the 
constraints imposed by the approach frequently adopted in previous research. The authors show 
that the constraints imposed by the models used in prior research are not supported and provide 
evidence that these models are misspecified.  
 
An area of inquiry that has received little attention is whether the market responds equally to 
situations where actual earnings exceeds expected earnings ( a positive surprise) as it does when 
actual earnings are less than expected earnings (a negative surprise). Schipper (1991) 
summarizes evidence from several empirical studies that shows that analysts, on average, tend to 
be optimistic in their forecasts. If investors are aware of the bias there should be stronger market 
responses to positive surprises than negative surprises for the same absolute unexpected earnings 
announcements (Freeman and Tse (1992)). This reasoning implies that price responses to 
unexpected earnings announcements could be asymmetric, which is contrary to assumptions 
made in most previous studies. In a more recent study, however, Brown (2001) finds that the 
median earnings surprise was negative in the eighties, zero in the early nineties and positive in 
the mid to late nineties. This suggests that if the bias in analysts’ forecasts is the sole explanation 
for an asymmetric response to earnings surprises then the pessimistic bias in analysts’ estimates 
in the late nineties should lead to stronger market reaction to negative surprises. Basu (1997) 
provides an alternative explanation for the asymmetric market reaction to earnings surprises 
documented in his study. The author notes that conservatism encourages accountants to 
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anticipate bad news and to usually regard it as a one-time earnings shock. In contrast, good news 
is recognized gradually over an extended period of time. Thus, the market recognizes positive 
earnings surprises as more persistent than negative earnings surprises. As a result, market 
reaction will be stronger for positive than negative surprises. 
 
The results from the few studies that have hypothesized an asymmetric response to unexpected 
earnings announcement are mixed. Freeman and Tse (1992) hypothesize a stronger response for 
positive surprises but find no empirical support. Conrad, Cornell and Landsman (2002) find that 
the market’s response to a negative surprise is stronger than the response to a positive surprise. 
Skinner and Sloan (2002) find a similar result to Conrad, Cornell and Landsman (2002), but 
show that the asymmetrical response holds only for growth stocks.  Bartov, Givoly and Hayn 
(2002) and Lopez and Rees (2002), on the other hand, provide evidence that the rewards for  
firms that beat analyst forecast is higher than the penalty for  those that fail to meet market 
expectations. 
 
Trading Volume/Earnings Research 
Trading volume has received considerable attention as an alternative to using the 
returns/earnings relationship to examine the information content of earnings. The advocates for 
using trading volume in addition to returns argue that the relationship between stock price 
changes and unexpected earnings captures only some aspects of investors’ reactions to the 
information content of earnings announcements.  Thus, investors may respond to the new 
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information without necessarily causing a price change. Beaver (1968) discusses a number of 
scenarios where reaction to new information may be observed in either price or trading volume 
but not both. He also argues that even when a reaction is observed in both measures, the response 
may not be equal. Although findings in a number of empirical studies based on trading volume 
have not differed significantly from those based on security prices, there is no reason to expect 
that studies comparing both measures would yield identical results (Bamber (1986).  Morse 
(1980) documents results that suggest that trading volume responses to the announcements of 
earnings is more pronounced than price response. Bamber and Cheon (1995) provide evidence of 
substantial differences in trading volume and price reactions around earnings announcements. 
They conclude that such different reactions suggest that “trading volume-based research has the 
potential to yield insights beyond that attainable through-price-based research”.   
 
Kim and Verrecchia (1991) argue that traders with better predisclosure private information react 
less to new information than those who are more poorly informed. Moreover, it is the existence 
of a differential in the quality of available information that creates abnormal trading volume. A 
number of studies have tested this hypothesis using various proxies for the differential in the 
quality of private information available to investors prior to earnings announcements. Atiase and 
Bamber (1994) use the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts and the range across the most optimistic 
and the most pessimistic analyst EPS forecasts as proxies and find support for the Kim -
Verrecchia (KV) hypothesis. They note a number of limitations with their proxies including the 
fact that the proxies reflect divergent expectations among analysts and not differences in the 
quality of predisclosure information as the theoretical proposition predicts. Kim, Krinsky and 
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Lee (1997) and Utama and Cready (1997) use the level of institutional holdings as a proxy. 
Contrary to the theoretical prediction, Kim et al (1997) find a significant positive relationship 
between abnormal trading volume and the level of institutional holdings. In a similar study that 
allows for nonlinearity in the relation, Utama and Cready (1997) show that the association 
between trading volume and the level of institutional ownership is quadratic and that the relation 
is negative in the high institutional ownership range. Specifically, they find the point of 
inflection to be about the 50% level of institutional ownership for their sample. This suggests 
that the impact of a differential in the quality of private predisclosure information on the levels of 
abnormal trading as predicted by the KV hypothesis might hold in samples with higher 
institutional holdings. Ali, Klasa and Li (2008) argue that institutions holding small stakes are 
unlikely to devote significant resources to gather private information and it might therefore be 
erroneous to treat such investors as well informed relative to individual investors. Furthermore, 
institutions with high ownership generally do not trade around earnings announcements since 
they are usually dedicated investors or face regulatory restrictions1. Ali et al (2008) therefore 
propose a refined measure of institutional ownership that treats institutions with medium 
holdings as investors with better predisclosure private information who are likely to trade around 
the announcement of earnings. They confirm the inverted U-shaped relationship between the 
levels of institutional holdings and abnormal trading surrounding earnings announcement 
documented in Utama and Cready (1997). 
 
                                                     
1
 Ali et al (2008), citing Bushee (1998) classifies institutions with a 5% or greater stake as dedicated investors since 
such investors are likely to be long-term investors. They also point out the sections of the securities regulations that 
such investors must abide by and argue that institutions with at least a 5% stake will not subject themselves to the 
extra scrutiny if they do not intend to be dedicated investors. 
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Background of Funds from Operation (FFO) 
The unique nature of REITs necessitated the introduction of FFO by the National Association of 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) in 1991 as a supplementary performance measure. 
NAREIT’s rationale for advocating such a measure was that depreciation, which forms part of 
GAAP earnings measures, was very substantial for equity REITs. Since depreciation is not an 
actual cash expense, its inclusion had the effect of distorting the true performance of REITs. The 
original definition of FFO stated that depreciation and amortization should be added back to 
consolidated net income. The definition has since been clarified in 1995, 1999 and 2002. 
 
 It is apparent from various statements issued by NAREIT that its original purpose in promoting 
FFO was quite modest. For instance, it states in its 2002 white paper that “the original intent was 
that FFO be used for the sake of determining a supplemental capitalization multiple similar to a 
P/E ratio” and that “FFO was not intended to be used as a measure of the cash generated by a 
REIT nor of its dividend paying capacity”.  
Since its introduction in 1991, the definition of the FFO measure has been revised a number of 
times. The changes made in 1995 to exclude nonrecurring items had unintended consequences as 
it created an opportunity for management to exercise discretion in what items it chose to add or 
exclude. The fact that FFO is an unaudited measure makes it impossible to detect any 
manipulations and raises serious doubts in the minds of some investors about its reliability 
(Martinez, 1998).  NAREIT responded to these concerns by establishing a Best Financial 
Practices Council to provide recommendations on how best to improve the uniformity and 
reliability of FFO. NAREIT adopted the recommendations of the Council in a National Policy 
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Bulletin issued on November 8, 1999 to include both recurring and nonrecurring items, effective 
January 2000. The National Policy Bulletin further clarified items that should be excluded from 
the calculation of FFO.  
 
Even though FFO is generally recognized by both REITs and investors, NAREIT concedes in a 
white paper issued in 2002 that greater guidance and interpretation was still needed. One area 
that remained ambiguous was the items firms could include as amortized items. The purpose  of 
the 2002 white paper was to address such problems. In its National Policy Bulletin issued in 
February, 2004, NAREIT noted that to “enhance usefulness and effectiveness of FFO” it was 
accepting the recommendations of the Best Financial Practices Council to develop “best 
practices” disclosures models. Such models are aimed at advancing consistency in financial 
reporting among REITs.  
 
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that FFO has evolved with a number of modifications 
since its introduction in 1991. Most of the changes have been in response to concerns of 
investors and analysts about the lack of consistency and uniformity in the calculation and 
reporting of FFO. The current definition per NAREIT’s white paper in 2002 is as follows: 
 “Funds from Operation means net income (computed in accordance with generally 
 accepted accounting principles), excluding gains (or losses) from sales of property, plus 
 depreciation and amortization and after adjustments for unconsolidated partnerships and 
 joint ventures”. 
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 FFO/Returns Studies 
Relative to studies examining the information content of EPS, the research on the usefulness of 
FFO is less extensive.  Vincent (1999) examined the information content of EPS versus FFO. 
using a model based on analysts’ forecasts. The results show no significant relationship between 
unexpected FFO and cumulative abnormal returns over both short and long-term windows. 
Similarly, Gore and Stott (1998) provide evidence suggesting unexpected FFO is not related to 
abnormal returns over the short run. Using annual return windows, Stunda and Typpo (2004) 
find a significant relationship with FFO and EPS as independent variables and abnormal returns 
as the dependent variable. However, it is impossible to solely assess the information content of 
FFO because Stunda and Typpo (2004) include both EPS and FFO in their regression. 
 
Higgins, Ott and Ness (2006) examine the market’s response to the FFO changes introduced in 
2000 and find no significant reaction, suggesting that investors’ perceptions of FFO may not 
have been altered significantly.  However, in a more recent study, Baik, Billings and Morton 
(2008), use a sample covering the period 1995 - 2003 and provide evidence that suggests the 
information content of FFO has significantly increased since 2000 and investors perceive less 
manipulation and greater reliability.  
A related line of research examines the question of whether FFO is more useful than net income. 
This question arises out of the claim that FFO is superior to net income because it reflects more 
accurately the performance of REITs. However, since FFO is unaudited and only an industry-
sanctioned metric, there are doubts as to whether it provides more useful information than the 
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traditional GAAP measures. Fields, Rangan and Thiagarajan (1998) assess the relative 
usefulness of FFO and net income by analyzing the association of FFO and net income or 
operating cash flows and current stock prices. They find that FFO may not be more useful than 
net income and that the superiority of one over the other depends on whether usefulness is 
defined as the ability of the two measures to explain subsequent operating performance or 
contemporaneous stock prices. In a similar study, Gore and Stott (1998) conclude that although 
FFO appears to be more informative than net income, the difference was not statistically 
significant. Vincent (1999) also examines the relative information content of EPS, FFO, cash 
from operations (CFO) and earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA) and concludes that there is no greater information content in FFO compared to the 
other three measures. The author argues that the lack of consistency in the computation of FFO 
across REITs and the fact that FFO is not audited may explain why investors still rely on EPS 
even though it has been shown not to correctly reflect REIT performance. Graham and Knight 
(2000) also conclude that FFO has greater information content than net income.  
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Hypotheses 
Based on the assertions of the efficient market hypothesis and evidence from a number of 
empirical studies, I hypothesize the following: 
H1:  There is a significant positive relationship between unexpected FFO and abnormal trading 
volume around the announcement date. 
H2: The market response to positive FFO surprises is stronger than responses to negative 
surprises 
The evidence documented in the literature suggests that analysts tended to be optimistic in their 
forecasts prior to the late nineties (Devos et al (2007), Brown (2001)). However, this tendency 
has dissipated in recent years, suggesting a symmetric response to positive and negative 
surprises. However, the conservatism argument put forward by Basu (1997) would suggest a 
stronger reaction to positive than negative surprises. Notwithstanding the mixed results in 
previous studies, the evidence seems to support an asymmetric response. 
 
H3: The relationship between unexpected FFO and abnormal trading volume should be stronger 
than the association between unexpected NI and abnormal trading volume.  
In January of 2000, NAREIT implemented guidelines aimed at ensuring the uniformity and 
reliability of FFO. Additionally, the SEC introduced rules in 2003 that impose stricter controls 
over FFO. These measures should make FFO more reliable and less susceptible to manipulation. 
Given the interventions described above and the fact that FFO is generally viewed as a more 
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accurate measure of REIT operating performance, I expect FFO to be more useful to investors 
than net income. 
H4: REITs with higher institutional holdings will have less abnormal trading volume than those 
with low institutional holdings. 
Since abnormal trading volume may be the result of a differential in the quality of private 
information available to traders prior to the announcement of an unexpected FFO (Kim and 
Verrecchia (1991)), I expect abnormal trading volume to be lower for REITs with higher 
percentage of institutional investors. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Data and Methodology 
Data 
I use the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES) database to identify REITs with 
unexpected FFO and Net Income (NI) during the periods January 1997 to December 1999 and 
January 2004 to December 2006. I use the two periods to enable me to compare the information 
content of FFO before and after the changes made by NAREIT to the definition of FFO and also 
to ensure the robustness of the findings.  The IBES database provides information on analysts’ 
forecasts of FFO and NI and actual FFO and NI for REITs listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). Daily return and trading volume 
data are derived from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. I obtain data 
on institutional holdings from CDA/Spectrum 13(f) institutional stock holdings, which are 
published quarterly.  
 
Prior to analyzing the data, each of the independent variables is centered at the mean of their 
means. As noted by Lambert, Edwards and Cable (2003), such a procedure facilitates the 
interpretation of results. Furthermore, the data is screened for outliers and influential cases. 
Following Fox (1991), I use leverage, Cook’s D statistic, and standardized residuals from the 
quadratic regression equation.  Three observations that exceed the minimum cut off on all three 
criteria and are clearly discrepant on scatter plots are dropped.  
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Methodology 
I use the event study methodology to derive the excess returns around an FFO or NI 
announcement. Daily excess returns around the event date will be calculated based on the value-
weighted daily return data from the CRSP. I calculate the cumulative excess return based on 
three different event windows: 2, 3 and 5 days around the date of the announcement using an 
estimation period of 250 days ending 20 days prior to the event.   
 
Two alternative measures will be used to estimate abnormal trading volume around an 
announcement of an unexpected FFO or Net Income announcement. First, I follow Chae (2005) 
and calculate abnormal trading volume as follows: 
Abnormal Volume Turnover Normal Log-Turnover Log=    (1) 
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Second, I calculate abnormal trading volume based on the market model estimated using the 
CRSP value-weighted index over a 30-day estimation period2 ending 11 days prior to the 
announcement. 
                                                     
2
 To ensure that results are robust, alternative specifications using different estimation periods are used and the 
results remain qualitatively the same. 
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I test hypotheses 1, 2, & 3 using two variations of the traditional difference score approach and 
compare them to the polynomial regression and response surface analysis approach. First, 
following tradition, I create a difference score between actual and expected FFO and estimate a 
regression using the difference score as a predictor. Second, I apply piecewise linear regression 
in an effort to estimate the predicted asymmetrical response. Third, I estimate an unconstrained 
polynomial regression equation using actual FFO and expected FFO as separate predictors, plot a 
three-dimensional response surface and test the features of the response surface. 
 
 The Constrained Linear Approach 
Traditionally, the Trading volume/FFO relationship has been modeled as follows: 
         
εαββ ∑
=
++−+=
k
i
iDYXCAT
1
10 )(                     (2) 
Where CAT is the cumulative abnormal trading volume around the announcement day, (X - Y) is 
the algebraic unexpected FFO deflated by some measure3 such as share price, X is actual FFO 
and Y is expected FFO. D represents year dummies. Expanding equation (2) results in the 
following: 
εαβββ ++−+= ∑
=
k
i
iDYXCAT
1
110          (3) 
                                                     
3
 A number of different deflators have been used to standardize the unexpected earning. These include share price 
(Cornell and Landsman, 1989; Freeman and Tse, 1992); or standard deviation of analyst forecasts (Datta and Dhillon, 
1993).     
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Note that the model specified in equation (2) is a constrained version of a model that uses both 
expected and actual FFO, which can be expressed as follows: 
                          εαβββ ++++= ∑
=
k
i
iDYXCAT
1
210                           (4) 
 Comparing equation (3) to equation (4) reveals that equation (2) constrains the coefficients in 
(2) to be of the same magnitude but opposite in sign (i.e. 21 ββ −= ).  However it allows for no 
empirical test on whether such an assumption is supported.  
 
The Constrained Piecewise Linear Model 
I use piecewise regression according to the principles recommended by Neter et al (1996) to test 
for asymmetric response. First, I create a variable Z, which is set equal to 0 for positive surprises 
but 1 otherwise. I then use the following equation: 
                  εαβββ ++−+−+= ∑
=
k
i
iDZYXYXCAT
1
210 )()(                                                    (5) 
Where CAT, X and Y are as defined before. 
 A negative and significant coefficient on 2β would indicate a weaker response to negative than 
positive surprises. Accounting for asymmetric responses using the piecewise regression approach 
implies that the relationship between cumulative abnormal returns and unexpected FFO follows a 
particular linear relation in some range of unexpected FFO but follows a different linear relation 
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elsewhere. Specifically, I expect the slope to be stronger for positive surprises than negative 
surprises. 
 
Polynomial Regression and Response Surface Analysis: The Unconstrained Approach 
I test for the joint effect of expected and actual FFO on cumulative abnormal returns by 
estimating an equation that uses each variable separately and includes their squared and product 
terms to capture possible curvilinearity and asymmetry in market reaction to unexpected FFO 
announcement. Our model of interest, which is the unconstrained quadratic regression, has the 
following form; 
                     εαββββββ ∑
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+++++++=
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2
54
2
3210                                 (6) 
Where CAT is the cumulative abnormal return, X represents actual FFO, Y is the mean analyst 
estimate and D represents year dummies. Equation (5) allows for the returns-FFO relationship to 
be plotted in a three dimensional space enabling the examination of how the market reacts to 
FFO announcements under three different scenarios; (1) actual FFO is higher than expected 
FFO; (2) actual FFO is lower than expected FFO and (3) actual FFO is equal to expected FFO.  
 
I examine the shape of the surface along the misfit line, which is defined by values where       
X=-Y. The shape along the misfit line captures the market reaction to unexpected FFO 
announcements, and is analogous to the unexpected earnings response coefficients in the 
traditional models. Substituting X = -Y into equation (5) yields the following: 
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       εββββββ ++−+−+= 2543210 )()( XXCAT                     (7) 
The term )( 543 βββ +− represents the curvature of the surface along the misfit line while the 
term )( 21 ββ − represents the slope of the surface along the misfit line both calculated at the 
point where X and Y equal the mean of their means.  
 
Secondly, I examine the shape of the surface along the fit line, which represents the line along 
which expected and actual FFO are equal. The fit line is defined by values where X = Y and 
substituting this into equation (8) yields the following: 
       εββββββ ++++++= 2543210 )()( XXCAT                 (8) 
The term )( 543 βββ ++ represents the curvature of the surface along the fit line while the term 
)( 21 ββ + represents the slope of the surface along the fit line at a point where X and Y equal the 
mean of their means. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates how the actual FFO and expected FFO relate to cumulative abnormal trading 
volume in a three-dimensional space. The vertical axis shows the cumulative abnormal trading 
volume while actual and expected FFO are represented on the x-axis and y-axis respectively. The 
misfit line (i.e. X = -Y) runs from the left corner to the right corner of the XY plane. The shape 
along the misfit line shows market responses when actual FFO deviate from expected FFO. The 
left side of the graph shows the market responses where actual FFO falls short of expected FFO 
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(negative surprises) while the right side of the graph indicates responses where actual exceeds 
expected FFO (positive surprises).  The shape along the fit line (i.e. X = Y), which runs the near 
corner to the far corner, shows market responses when actual and expected FFO are equal.  
 
Test for hypothesis 3 requires an estimation of equation (8) using expected and actual Net 
Income in place of FFO and comparing the variance explained to that obtained when the FFO 
variables are used. I use the Vuong likelihood ratio to test whether the R2 of the FFO model is 
statistically different from the NI model. A significantly larger R2 for the FFO equation will 
indicate a higher information content of FFO than NI providing support for hypothesis 3. Clarke 
(2007) shows that when the distribution of the log-likelihood ratios used in the Vuong test is 
highly peaked, an alternative distribution-free test provides a more efficient test. Since I do not 
know, a priori, the distribution of the log-likelihood ratios, I also use Clarke’s simple 
distribution-free test in testing for difference between the two models. 
 
Testing for an Asymmetric Response (Hypothesis 2) 
 Hypothesis 2 predicts stronger responses for positive surprises than negative surprises. To test 
this hypothesis using the unconstrained curvilinear model, I re-center each variable both at one 
standard deviation above its mean and one standard deviation below its mean. I calculate the 
slope for negative surprises by first estimating equation (7) using the actual FFO variable 
centered at one standard deviation below its mean and the expected FFO variable at one standard 
deviation above its mean and then calculating the slope using equation (8). Similarly, I calculate 
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the slope for positive surprise by estimating equation (7) using the actual FFO variable centered 
at one standard deviation above its mean and the expected FFO variable at one standard 
deviation below its mean and then calculate the slope using equation (8). Next, to test whether 
the absolute value of the slope for positive surprises is significantly greater than the slope for 
negative surprises, I apply bootstrapping procedures to empirically derive the sampling 
distribution and then construct confidence intervals around the difference in slopes. I draw 1000 
bootstrap samples and use the bias corrected percentile method suggested by Stine (1989) to 
construct the confidence intervals.  
 
 Test of Hypothesis 4 (Kim and Verrecchia Hypothesis) 
To test whether REITs with higher institutional holdings have less abnormal trading than those 
with low institutional holdings I estimate the following equation: 
εαβββ ∑
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                            (9) 
Where IO is the percentage of institutional ownership in a REIT and Z is a vector of control 
variables including firm size, absolute cumulative abnormal return around the announcement 
date, and stock price.  Prior studies (Ali et al (2008), Utama and Cready (1997), Atiase and 
Bamber (1994)) have identified these variables to be significantly related to abnormal trading 
volume. A significant negative coefficient on IO will indicate support for hypothesis 4. Since Ali 
et al (2008), Utama and Cready (1997) document evidence of nonlinearity in the relationship 
between abnormal trading and institutional holdings, I will re-estimate equation (9) by including 
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the square of IO to test whether the inverted U-shaped relationship documented in these studies 
hold in samples with high institutional holdings. 
 
As documented in prior studies, I expect the coefficient on size to be negatively related to 
abnormal trading. This expectation is based on the premise that larger firms have greater 
predisclosure information making their FFO announcement less informative (Ali et al (2008), 
Utama and Cready (1997), Atiase and Bamber (1994)). Kim and Verrecchia (1991) hypothesize 
a positive relationship between abnormal trading and absolute abnormal return around the 
announcement date. This, coupled with the empirical evidence in a number of studies, leads me 
to expect a positive and significant coefficient on absolute abnormal returns.  Ali et al (2008), 
Utama and Cready (1997) use stock price to control for the effect of transaction costs on trading 
volume at the announcement of earnings They posit and find a positive relationship between 
price and abnormal trading volume. I therefore expect to find a positive relationship between 
abnormal trading and stock price. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations of the measures. The table shows that, 
on average, analysts’ forecasts of FFO tend to be higher than actual FFO announced by REITs. 
Analysts’ forecasts of net income (NI) also tend to be higher than the actual. Correlation between 
actual FFO and analyst estimates of FFO is 0.90 indicating that higher estimates are followed by 
higher actual FFO. The correlation between actual NI and analyst estimates is only 0.565 
indicating that higher estimates of NI are not necessarily followed by higher actual NI. The mean 
number of analysts forecasting FFO and NI is 8 and 3 respectively. The fact that more analysts 
provide estimates of FFO than NI suggests that investors have a greater demand for FFO.   
 
FFO Announcements and Abnormal Trading Volume 
Tables 2 and 3 present the abnormal trading volume generated on the announcement of FFO by 
REITs based on two alternative definitions. As the results show, for all windows used, there is 
significant abnormal trading volume around the announcement dates. This suggests that the 
market engages in significantly more trading when REITs announce FFO irrespective of whether 
it misses, meets or beats the consensus forecast by analysts. The table also shows that the level of 
trading prior to the announcement of FFO is negative and significant in the market-based 
specifications suggesting that the market tends to reduce trading activity in anticipation of the 
FFO announcement. The pattern of abnormal trading volume prior to and around the date of the 
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announcement of FFO is consistent with the trading pattern around the announcement of 
earnings information for non-REITs. (See for example Chae, 2005)  
 
To examine whether the level of abnormal trading volume is associated with the level of the 
surprise contained in the FFO announcement, I estimate three regressions. The first is based on 
the traditional specifications frequently used in the existing literature that uses the difference 
between actual FFO and expected FFO scaled by price as an independent variable to explain 
abnormal trading volume. The second specification modifies the first by allowing for different 
slopes for positive and negative surprises and use piecewise regression. Lastly, I use an 
unconstrained polynomial regression that allows for curvilinearity in the relation between 
abnormal trading volume and FFO surprises.  
 
Table 4 presents the results based on the traditional specification. The results show that for all 
windows, there is no significant relationship between abnormal trading volume and the level of 
surprise in the announcement of FFO. This is indicated by R2s that are not statistically different 
from zero. Since the traditional specification is a constrained version of the specification that 
uses both expected and actual FFO as independent variables, I present an unconstrained linear 
regression in Table 4. This allows me to formally test whether the constraints imposed by the 
traditional specification may be driving the results. The result of the F-test shows no significant 
difference in the variance explained by the traditional specification and the unconstrained 
version. 
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The results from the piecewise regression are presented in Table 5. The results show no 
significant relationship as indicated by the R2s that are not statistically different from zero. In 
addition, tests of the difference in model R2s show no significant difference between the 
piecewise regression and the traditional specifications. This suggests that the lack of association 
between abnormal trading volume and the size of the surprise holds when I allow for different 
slopes for negative and positive surprises. This is further confirmed by the insignificant 
coefficient on the coded variable. 
 
I present the results based on the unconstrained polynomial regression in Table 6.  The results 
show insignificant R2s for all windows. An F-test for difference in R2s for the unconstrained 
linear and quadratic specifications shows no significant difference. These results suggest that the 
lack of significant relationship between abnormal trading volume and the size of surprise is 
robust to different specifications.  
 
These results are inconsistent with the findings documented for non-REITs that also use trading 
volume as a measure of investor response (see Bamber, 1987, Bamber and Cheon, 1995 and 
Cready and Hurtt, 2002). Moreover, results from a number of studies examining the information 
content of FFO using abnormal returns as a gauge of investor reaction have documented 
significant relationship between FFO surprises and abnormal returns (see Gyamfi-Yeboah, 
Ziobrowski and Lambert, 2010 and Baik, Billings and Morton 2008). This suggests that there 
may be peculiar characteristics of REITs that limits investors’ ability to fully trade on the 
announcement of FFO surprises. Barclay, Kandel and Marx (1998) show that higher transaction 
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costs significantly reduce trading volume but have no effect on share prices. This suggests that in 
the presence of higher transaction costs, market response through share price changes could be 
more pronounced than changes in trading volume.  It is well documented (Subrahmanyam, 2007; 
Bertin, Kofman, Michayluk and Prather, 2005 and Ghosh, Miles and Sirmans, 1996) that REITs 
have, on average, a relatively high bid-ask spread (a proxy for transaction cost) and are relatively 
less liquid compared to non-REITs. It is plausible to argue that the higher bid-ask spreads for 
REITs, which reflects a lack on consensus on prices may limit the amount of trading that occurs 
in response to the announcement of FFO surprises.  
 
Information Content of Net Income vs. FFO (Test of Hypothesis 3) 
To address the question of whether FFO conveys more useful information about REITs 
performance when compared to traditional GAAP measures, notably net income, I re-estimate all 
equations using net income in place of FFO. Since the evidence presented in both Downs and 
Guner (2006) and Baik, Billings and Morton (2008) suggest that FFO may be more useful to 
investors, I expect the variance explained by the regressions containing FFO to be significantly 
larger than those containing net income.  
 
 I present the results of the FFO versus Net Income regressions in Table 7. Since the preceding 
results indicate no significant relation between abnormal trading volume and FFO surprises, I use 
abnormal returns as the dependent variable. To ensure that the results are robust, I use two 
specifications: the constrained linear regression (difference score) and the unconstrained 
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polynomial regression. As the results show, R2 from the regression using net income is 
substantially lower than the R2 from the regression using FFO.  A test for the difference in R2 
using Clarke’s distribution free test shows that FFO explains significantly more variance in 
abnormal returns than net income supporting our conjecture that FFO provides more useful 
information to investors than net income.  
 
Informed Traders and Abnormal Trading Volume (Test of Hypothesis 4) 
I test Kim and Verrecchia’s (1991) hypothesis that firms with more informed traders will 
experience less abnormal trading on the announcement of earnings (or FFO). The results of the 
regression testing this hypothesis are presented in Table 8. The main variable of interest is the 
proportion of outstanding shares held by institutions (IO) at the end of each quarter prior to the 
FFO announcement. I include control variables that have been documented in prior studies to be 
significantly related to abnormal trading volume. I find, as expected, that absolute abnormal 
returns are significantly positively related to abnormal trading volume. I also find price to be 
significantly related to the abnormal trading while firm size does not appear to have any 
significant impact. As the results in the table show, even though the proxy for the level of 
informed traders enters the regression with the expected sign, the coefficient is not statistically 
different from zero. Consistent with the approach adopted in prior studies, I include a quadratic 
term for IO but obtain the same results. This suggests that, for REITs, the level of institutional 
ownership does not appear to have a significant impact on the abnormal trading volume observed 
on the announcement of FFO. This result is in contrast to the findings documented in Kim, 
Krinsky and Lee (1997) and Utama and Cready (1997) for non-REITs. I speculate that the 
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relatively high transaction costs for REITs may limit the trading by uninformed traders who may 
want to trade on the announcement of FFO.   
 
To formally test whether the results documented above are driven by the relatively higher 
transaction costs for REITs, I interact log price (a proxy for transaction cost) with IO and include 
this term in a regression predicting abnormal trading volume. The results are presented in Table 
9. A significant and positive coefficient on the interaction term would indicate that the impact of 
the level of institutional ownership on abnormal trading volume depends on the level of 
transaction costs. Specifically, such a result would suggest that REITs with lower transaction 
costs and higher levels of institutional ownership are more likely to have lower volume of 
trading on the announcement of FFO. As the results show, the coefficient on the interaction term 
is positive and significant supporting the conjecture that the lack of significance on the 
institutional ownership variable may partly be explained by the relatively high transaction costs 
for REITs. Figure 2 demonstrates the relation between abnormal trading volume and the levels of 
institutional ownership at three different values of price: the mean, one standard deviation above 
the mean and below the mean. The y-axis shows cumulative abnormal trading volume while the 
x-axis shows the centered values for levels of institutional ownership. As the figure shows, the 
slope for the level of institutional ownership varies for different values of price. 
 
Dennis and Strickland (2002) document different trading behavior for different types of 
institutional investors. The authors decompose institutional ownership into four categories and 
find some classes of institutional investors, especially mutual funds and investment advisors, to 
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be more active traders than other classes such as banks and insurance companies. They argue that 
mutual funds and investment advisors tend to “herd together and trade with the momentum”. It is 
important to point out that after 1998, the break down of institutional ownership into the four 
categories is unreliable due to coding errors. As a result, the purpose of this analysis is to assess 
whether the use of an aggregate measure of institutional ownership is appropriate and not so 
much on the trading behavior of each category of institutional investors.  Figure 3 shows the 
proportion of institutional ownership in REITs by institution type over the sample period. The 
average institutional ownership over the sample is about 73%. The pattern of institutional 
ownership is stable over the sample period with no discernable shifts in ownership patterns. 
 
Table 10 contains the results of the analysis using two broad classifications of institutional 
investors: namely (1) mutual funds and investment advisor (IOM) and (2) all other institutions 
(IOA). The classification is based on the coding used in the Thompson Reuters 13(f) data. The 
decision to form the two groups was influenced by the findings in Dennis and Strickland (2002), 
which suggest that mutual funds and investment advisors may trade frequently and have a shorter 
holding period than pension funds, banks and insurance companies.  I expect the coefficient on 
the IOM variable to be positive and significant while that on IOA is expected to be negative and 
significant.  As the results show, there is a significant and positive relationship between the level 
of holdings by mutual funds and investment advisors and the level of abnormal trading volume 
around FFO announcement. I also find a significant negative relationship at the 10% level 
between the level of ownership by other institutional investors (pension funds & endowments, 
banks and insurance) and the level of abnormal trading volume around the announcement of 
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FFO. Taken together, these and the previous results using aggregated institutional ownership 
variable suggest that institutional investors are not homogeneous and may therefore exhibit 
different trading behaviors. The results also indicate that the use of an aggregate measure of 
institutional ownership as proxy for informed traders to test hypotheses such as Kim and 
Verracchia’s has the potential of masking the predicted relationships. These results bring into 
question the appropriateness of using aggregate institutional ownership as a proxy for informed 
traders since as Downs and Guner (1999) note investors may trade for reasons other than 
informational advantage. 
 
Robustness checks 
To assess the robustness of the results, I carry out analyses based on FFO announcements 
between 1997 and 1999. Tables 11 and 12 contain the cumulative abnormal trading volume 
around the announcement of FFO. In contrast to the results for 200 -2006 period, investors 
appear not to engage in significantly more trading on the announcement of FFO except for 
positive surprises when abnormal trading volume is measured based on firm specific data. The 
market-based measure is, however, generally consistent with the 2004 -2006 results. To examine 
whether the level of abnormal trading volume is related to the surprise contained in the FFO 
announcement, I use three different specifications. The results are presented in Tables 13, 14, 15 
for the difference score, piecewise regression and polynomial regression specifications 
respectively. In all three specifications, there is no significant relationship between the level of 
abnormal trading volume around the announcement of FFO and the surprise contained in the 
announcement. Additional analyses (for both 2004 -2006 and 1997 – 1999 sample periods) that 
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include an interaction variable created between the time dummies and FFO surprises show no 
significant time variation in the relation between cumulative abnormal trading volume and FFO 
surprises. 
 
I also examine the impact informed traders have on the levels of abnormal trading volume for the 
1997 -1999 sample period. Figure 4 shows the proportion of REITs shares held by the different 
categories of institutional investors. On average, institutions held about 52% of REIT 
outstanding shares over this period. Note that the pattern of institutional ownership by category 
experienced a significant shift during the first quarter of 1999. Prior to this time, mutual funds 
and investment advisors held a significant majority of REIT shares.  Even though the total 
number of shares held by institutions in the aggregate did not significantly change after the first 
quarter of 1999, mutual funds and investment advisors significantly reduced their stakes in 
REITs while pension funds and endowment appear to have taken up the shares previously held 
by mutual funds and investment advisors. The apparent shift in ownership among institutions 
may be the result of coding errors that occurred around this time.  As a result of this shift in 
ownership among institutions, I create an indicator variable to control for any impact the shift in 
ownership pattern may have on the results. 
The first set of results, presented in Table 16, examines how institutions in the aggregate impact 
the level of abnormal trading volume. There is no significant relationship between the proportion 
of shares held by institutions and abnormal of trading volume on the announcement of FFO 
confirming the earlier results.  The results, using two broad classifications of institutional 
investors: namely mutual funds and investment advisors and all other institutions are presented 
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in Table 17. The results indicate no significant relationship between any of the institutional 
categories and abnormal trading volume. To control for the shift in ownership that occurred in 
the first quarter of 1999, I create an indicator variable, which is coded 1 for ownership post 1999 
first quarter and 0 otherwise. I then create an interaction variable between the two categories of 
ownership and the indicator variable.  
 
The results, which are presented in Table 18, show that even though there is a significant positive 
relationship between holdings by other institutions (pension funds, banks and insurance), the 
relationship is significantly lower after 1999. The coefficient on ownership by mutual funds and 
investment advisors is not significant. These results, even though in contrast to those for the 
2004 to 2006 sample period4, suggest that institutional investors are heterogeneous in their 
trading behaviors. It may therefore be inappropriate to use an aggregate measure of institutional 
ownership in examining the trading behavior of institutions.  
 
Lastly, to examine whether the coefficient on institutional ownership is time varying I interact 
the time dummies with the institutional ownership variable. The results of the regression analysis 
show no significant relation between the interaction variable and cumulative abnormal trading 
volume. This suggests that the lack of association between the levels of institutional ownership 
(in the aggregate) and abnormal trading volume around the announcement of FFO is not time 
varying. 
                                                     
4
 The difference in results may be due to coding errors in the institution type data noted earlier. 
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Dispersions in Analysts’ Forecast and Abnormal Trading Volume 
In addition to using the proportion of institutional ownership as a proxy for the number of 
informed traders to test Kim and Verracchia’s hypothesis, a number of researchers have 
examined how other measures of predisclosure uncertainty affect the level of abnormal trading 
volume around the announcement of earnings (see Bamber, Barron and Stober, 1997, Atiase and 
Bamber, 1994). A measure that has frequently been used in the literature is the dispersion in 
analysts’ forecast prior to the announcement. But as already noted in the literature review 
section, this measure may reflect divergent expectations among analysts and not necessarily 
differences in the quality of predisclosure information as the theoretical proposition predicts. 
Bamber, Barron and Stober, (1997) drawing support from Barron, Kim, Lim and Stevens (1997), 
argue that Kim and Verracchia’s model supports the conjecture that trading volume will be 
positively related to dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. 
 
Notwithstanding this limitation, the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts has been found to be 
positively related to the level of abnormal trading volume (Bamber, Barron and Stober, 1997, 
Atiase and Bamber, 1994). This suggests that higher levels of disagreement among analysts 
should result in greater levels of trading on the announcement of earnings (FFO).  As a further 
test of robustness, I regress the abnormal trading volume on the dispersion in analysts’ forecast 
and report the results in Table 19. There is a significant and positive relationship between the 
level of dispersion in analysts’ forecasts and the level of abnormal trading volume around the 
announcement of FFO. The coefficients on the control variables are generally as expected and 
documented in our previous results using the proportion of institutional ownership.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH IDEAS 
Conclusion 
A fundamental question that has been addressed quite extensively in accounting, finance and real 
estate literature is whether investors respond significantly to the announcement of earnings or 
cash flow measures such as funds from operations (FFO). The premise of this question is that if 
financial markets are efficient and earnings information is indeed central to the pricing of stocks 
then investors should respond to the announcement of earnings or FFO surprises and lead to 
abnormal trading returns or trading volume. In this dissertation, I examine the market reaction to 
the announcement of FFO by REITs using abnormal trading volume as a gauge of investors’ 
reaction. I also address the question of whether FFO provides more useful information to 
investors than net income. Lastly, I assess the impact that institutional investors have on the level 
of abnormal trading observed on the announcement of FFO.  
 
To examine whether the level of abnormal trading volume is associated with the size of the 
surprise contained in the FFO announcement, I estimate three regressions. The first is based on 
the traditional specifications frequently used in the existing literature that uses the difference 
between actual FFO and expected FFO scaled by price as an independent variable explaining 
abnormal trading volume. The second specification modifies the first by allowing for different 
slopes for positive and negative surprises and use piecewise regression. Lastly, I use an 
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unconstrained polynomial regression that allows for curvilinearity in the relation between 
abnormal trading volume and FFO surprises.  
 
The results indicate that even though the announcement of FFO leads to abnormal trading, there 
is no association between the level of abnormal trading volume and the size of the surprise 
contained in the FFO announcement. This is in contrast to the evidence documented in the 
literature for non-REITs (Bamber, 1987, Bamber and Cheon, 1995 and Cready and Hurtt, 2002). 
A plausible explanation for the results is the relatively high transaction costs associated with 
REITs. Consistent with the findings in Barclay, Kandel and Marx (1998), I posit that in the 
presence of higher transaction costs, market response through share price changes could be more 
pronounced than changes in trading volume. I also find, using abnormal returns as a measure of 
investor response, that FFO explains significantly more variance in abnormal returns than net 
income suggesting that FFO provides more useful information than net income. 
 
 I use the proportion of institutional holdings as a proxy for the number of informed traders to 
predict the amount of abnormal trading volume. I find no significant relation between abnormal 
trading volume and the proportion of institutional holdings. This also contrasts sharply with the 
findings for non-REITs. This is also inconsistent with the predictions in Kim and Verracchia 
(1991) and may partly be explained by the relatively high transaction cost for REIT. To further 
assess how different categories of institutional investors react to the announcement of FFO, I 
classify institutions into two broad classifications; namely (1) mutual funds and investment 
advisor and (2) all other institutions. I find that the level of abnormal trading volume is 
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significantly positively related to the holdings by mutual funds and investment advisors but 
negatively related to the holdings of other institutions (pension funds &.endowments, banks and 
insurance companies). This raises questions of whether the use of an aggregate measure of 
institutional ownership is appropriate in studies that examine the effect of institutional holdings. 
 
Finally, I use the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts, a measure of predisclosure uncertainty to 
predict the level of abnormal trading volume around the announcement of FFO and find a 
significant and positive relationship between the level of dispersion in analysts’ forecast and the 
level of abnormal trading volume around the announcement of FFO. This finding suggests that a 
REIT with less analysts’ consensus on expected FFO is more likely to experience more intense 
trading around the announcement date.  
 
Future Research Ideas 
In this dissertation, I show that trading volume does not appear to fully capture investors’ 
reaction to the announcement of FFO by REITs suggesting that use of stock price changes may 
better reflect investors’ responses. I attribute the lack of association between abnormal trading 
volume and the size of FFO surprises partly to the relatively high transaction costs of REITs. A 
future study that examines more closely the nature and extent of transaction cost constraints will 
provide useful extensions to the literature. In this regard, alternative measures of transaction 
costs could be used to enable more robust conclusions to be drawn.  
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I also show that FFO provides more information to investors compared to net income using a 
sample of equity REITs. It is arguable that for mortgage REITs, the distinction between FFO and 
net income would be less pronounced. A future study that looks at the relative information 
content of FFO and net income within the context of mortgage REITs will likely shed light on 
the extent investors view the distorting nature of depreciation. 
 
Finally, I show that the use of an aggregate measure of institutional ownership as a proxy for 
informed investors may be inappropriate given the heterogeneous nature of different institution 
types. A future study that uses disaggregated data and overcomes the coding errors in the 
Thompson Reuters data could provide new insights into the trading behavior of different 
institution. This will help to clarify which of the institutions may represent a better proxy for 
informed traders.    
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations among measure 
This table reports the summary statistics and the correlations among actual FFO; actual Net Income (NI) expected FFO and Expected Net Income (NI).  All FFO and 
NI numbers are in US$ per share. The sample consists of 1147 announcements of FFO and NI by REITs listed on the NYSE and AMEX between 2004 and 2006.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Means and standard deviations                                    Correlation Matrix 
 
 M sd Actual FFO Exp. FFO Actual NI Exp. NI 
Actual FFO 0.563 0.336     
Expected FFO 0.569 0.291 0.903    
Actual NI  0.263 0.261 0.547 0.461   
Expected NI 0.306 0.454 0.493 0.528 0.565  
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Table 2: Abnormal Trading Volume around the announcement of FFO 
 Number of 
Observations 
-10, -3  -5, 1 -2, 2 -1, 1 
CAT for Positive Surprises (%) 529  -2.20  56.16***  32.50***  17.95***  
CAT for Zero Surprises (%)  248  -7.38  34.40***  17.82***  8.58**  
CAT for Negative Surprises (%) 370  -11.13  59.27***  31.47***  20.24***  
This table reports the cumulative abnormal trading volume around the announcement of FFO by REITs listed on the NYSE and AMEX between 
2004 and 2006 and the number of observations. The cumulative abnormal trading volume is estimated as the difference between log turnover and 
average turnover over an estimation period of 30 days ending 11 days prior to the event. Turnover is defined as trading volume divided by shares 
outstanding. The columns labeled (-10, -3), (-5, 1), (-2. 2)and (-1, 1) are the cumulative abnormal trading volume over the 8 days prior to the 
announcement, 7, 5 and 3  days around FFO announcements respectively.  
 
 
*** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 1% level. 
 ** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 5% level 
* indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 10% level 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 48 - 
 
Table 3: Abnormal Trading Volume around the announcement of FFO – Robustness Check 
 Obs. -10, -3  -5, 1 -2, 2 -1, 1 
CAT for Positive Surprises (%) 529  -53.21***  102.73***  58.83***  37.84***  
CAT for Zero Surprises (%)  248  -60.11***  60.29***  35.91***  22.27***  
CAT for Negative Surprises (%) 370  -74.00***  112.5***  64.65***  46.37***  
This table reports the cumulative abnormal trading volume around the announcement of FFO by REITs listed on the NYSE and AMEX between 
2004 and 2006 and the number of observations. The cumulative abnormal trading volume are estimated based on the market model using the 
value-weighted daily trading volume data from CRSP and an estimation period of 30 days ending 11 days prior to the event. 
 
The columns 
labeled (-10, -3), (-5, 1), (-2. 2)and (-1, 1) are the cumulative abnormal trading volume over the 8 days prior to the announcement, 7, 5 and 3  
days around FFO announcements respectively.  
 
 
*** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 1% level. 
 ** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 5% level 
* indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 10% level 
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Table 4: Linear regression estimates of the association between FFO surprises and cumulative 
abnormal trading volume 
  
Constrained Equation 
                  
                Unconstrained  Equation 
  
(X – Y) 
 
R2 
 
Adj. R2 
  
X 
 
Y 
 
R2 
 
Adj. R2 
 
FC 
 
FH 
CAT 7 -0.769 0.005 0.002   -0.219  0.234 0.005 0.002 0.163  0.188 
CAT 5 -0.389 0.002 0.000   -0.133 0.145 0.002 -0.001 0.928    0.611 
CAT 3 -1.884 0.002 0.000   -0.169 0.204 0.003 0.000 0.792    0.476 
This table reports the results of the regression analysis for the difference score model (equation (2) - the constrained equation) and its 
corresponding unconstrained version (equation (4).  
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For columns labeled (X-Y), X, and Y, values represent unstandardized regression coefficients from equations in which X is the actual FFO, Y is 
the expected FFO and the dependent variable (CAT) is the cumulative abnormal trading volume around the announcement date. The column Fc 
presents the F-ratios for the test of the constraints imposed by the algebraic difference score (the constrained equation), which is equivalent to the 
test of the difference in R2 values for the constrained and unconstrained equations (df 1, N-3). The column labeled FH presents F-ratios for the test 
of higher order terms in a quadratic equation i.e X2, XY and Y2 (d.f 3, N-5). CAT7, CAT5, and CAT3 are the 7 day, 5 day and 3 day cumulative 
abnormal returns respectively.
 
 
*** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 1% level. 
 ** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 5% level 
* indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 10% level 
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Table 5: The Constrained Piecewise Linear Regression estimates of the association between FFO 
surprises and cumulative abnormal trading volume 
 
 
 
X - Y 
 
(X –Y)Z 
 
R2 
 
Adj. R2 
CAT 7 0.140 -0.390 0.006 0.002 
CAT 5 0.512 -0.702 0.003 0.000 
CAT 3 0.239 -0.440 0.003 0.000 
  This table reports the results of the regression analysis for the difference score combined with piecewise regression model (equation (5).  
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Columns labeled (X-Y) and(X-Y)Z are unstandardized regression coefficients where X is the actual FFO, Y is the expected FFO and Z is an indicator variable set to 0 
for positive surprises/no surprise but 1 for negative surprises .The dependent variable (CAT) is the cumulative abnormal trading volume around the announcement 
date. 
*** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 1% level. 
 ** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 5% level 
* indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 10% level 
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Table 6: Unconstrained Polynomial Regression estimates of the association between FFO surprises 
and cumulative abnormal trading volume 
       
X 
     
 Y 
   
 X 2  
    
XY 
    
Y 2
   
 
    
R2 
 
Adj. R2 
 
CAT7 
 
-1.026** 
 
1.052** 
 
-0.392 
 
0.413 
 
0.168 
 
0.009 
 
0.003 
CAT5 -0.867** 0.867** -0.364** 0.520 0.051 0.008 0.002 
CAT3 -0.737*** -0.781*** -0.301** 0.763 -0.361 0.009 0.003 
This table reports the results of the regression analysis for the unconstrained polynomial regression (equation 6).  
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For columns labeled X, Y, X2, XY and Y2 values represent unstandardized regression coefficients from equations in which X is the actual FFO, Y 
is the expected FFO and the dependent variable (CAT) is the cumulative abnormal trading volume around the announcement date. CAT7, CAT5, 
and CAT3 are the 7 day, 5 day and 3 day cumulative abnormal trading volume respectively.
 
*** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 1% level. 
 ** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 5% level 
* indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 10% level 
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Table 7: Comparison of FFO vs. Net Income 
Model  Measure  R2  Vuong Test  Clarke’s Test 
Constrained Linear  FFO  0.018***   
-1.301 
 
342*** 
NI 0.004  
Unconstrained Quadratic FFO  0.029 ***  
-1.106 
 
447*** 
NI 0.014 ** 
This table reports the R2 from the regression analysis for the constrained linear (equation 2) and unconstrained quadratic regression equation 
(equation 6) for FFO and net income (NI).  
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Where X is the actual FFO (NI), Y is the expected FFO (NI) and the dependent variable (CAT) is the cumulative abnormal trading volume 
around the announcement date
 
*** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 1% level. 
 ** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 5% level 
* indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 10% level 
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Table 8: OLS regression estimates of the impact of institutional ownership on abnormal trading 
volume 
Variable  Coefficient 
Constant     -0.525** 
Absolute abnormal return       9.497*** 
Price       0.192** 
Size       0.023 
Institutional ownership      -0.094 
Adjusted R2      0.047*** 
This table reports the results of the regression analysis testing for the impact of institutional ownership on abnormal trading volume around the 
announcement of FFO. The dependent variable is the 7 day cumulative abnormal trading volume and defined as the difference between log 
turnover and average turnover over an estimation period of 30 days ending 11 days prior to the event.  
 
*** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 1% level. 
 ** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 5% level 
* indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 10% level 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 55 - 
Table 9: OLS regression estimates of effect of transaction cost on the relation between 
institutional ownership and abnormal trading volume 
Variable  Coefficient 
Constant        0.023 
Absolute abnormal return        9.455*** 
Price        0.184** 
Size        0.026 
Institutional ownership (IO)      -0.004 
IOPrice       0.369* 
Adjusted R2       0.051*** 
 
This table reports the results of the regression analysis testing for the impact of institutional ownership on abnormal trading volume around the 
announcement of FFO conditioned on price (a proxy for transaction cost). The dependent variable is the 7 day cumulative abnormal trading 
volume defined as difference between log turnover and average turnover over an estimation period of 30 days ending 11 days prior to the event  
 
*** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 1% level. 
 ** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 5% level 
* indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 10% level 
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Table 10: OLS regression estimates of association between institutional ownership type and 
abnormal trading volume 
Variable  Coefficient 
Constant           -0.663 
Absolute abnormal return            0.088*** 
Price            0.171* 
Size            0.049 
Mutual funds/investment advisors (IOM)           1.688*** 
Other Institutions (IOA)          -0.370* 
Adjusted R2           0.055*** 
This table reports the results of the regression analysis testing for the impact of institutional ownership on abnormal trading volume around the 
announcement of FFO using two broad classifications of institutional investors: mutual funds and investment advisors in one group and all others 
in another. The dependent variable is the 7 day cumulative abnormal trading volume defined as the difference between log turnover and average 
turnover over an estimation period of 30 days ending 11 days prior to the event.  
 
*** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 1% level. 
 ** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 5% level 
* indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 10% level 
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Table 11: Abnormal trading volume around the announcement of FFO: 1997 -1999 
 Number of 
Observations 
-10, 3 -5, 1 -2, 2 -1, 1 
CAT for Positive Surprises (%) 387 -6.53 16.49** 12.77** 10.22*** 
CAT for Zero Surprises (%) 270 -14.25    5.92 4.14 3.86 
CAT for Negative Surprises (%) 179 -1.03    17.27 8.77 7.42 
This table reports the cumulative abnormal trading volume around the announcement of unexpected FFO by REITs listed on the NYSE and 
AMEX between 1997 and 1999 and the number of observations. The cumulative abnormal trading volume is estimated as the difference between 
log turnover and average turnover over an estimation period of 30 days ending 11 days prior to the event. Turnover is defined as trading volume 
divided by shares outstanding. The columns labeled (-10, -3), (-5, 1), (-2. 2)and (-1, 1) are the cumulative abnormal trading volume over the 8 
days prior to the announcement, 7, 5 and 3  days around FFO announcements respectively. 
*** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 1% level. 
 ** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 5% level 
* indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 10% level 
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Table 12: Abnormal trading volume around the announcement of FFO: 1997 - 1999 Robustness 
Check 
 Number of 
observations 
-10, -3  -5, 1 -2, 2 -1, 1 
CAT for Positive Surprises (%) 387 -48.77***  27.11***  16.52***  19.02***  
CAT for Zero Surprises (%)  270 -66.04***  -7.14  -10.02**  -2.56*  
CAT for Negative Surprises (%) 179 -49.45***  26.57*** 9.00** 9.63**  
This table reports the cumulative abnormal trading volume around the announcement of unexpected FFO by REITs listed on the NYSE and 
AMEX between 1997 and 1999 and the number of observations. The cumulative abnormal trading volume are estimated based on the market 
model using the value-weighted daily trading volume data from CRSP and an estimation period of 30 days ending 11 days prior to the event. 
 
The 
columns labeled (-10, -3), (-5, 1), (-2. 2)and (-1, 1) are the cumulative abnormal trading volume over the 8 days prior to the announcement, 7, 5 
and 3  days around FFO announcements respectively.  
 
 
*** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 1% level. 
 ** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 5% level 
* indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 10% level 
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Table 13: Linear regression estimates of the association between FFO surprises and cumulative 
abnormal trading volume: 1997 -1999 
  
Constrained Equation 
 
                  
                Unconstrained  Equation 
  
(X – Y) 
 
R2 
 
Adj. R2 
  
X 
 
Y 
 
R2 
 
Adj. R2 
 
FC 
 
FH 
CAT 7 3.851 0.000 -0.001   -0.688  1.381 0.007 0.004 0.744  0.872 
CAT 5 18.226 0.002 0.000   0.596 -0.261 0.003 0.001 0.682    0.761 
CAT 3 13.511 0.002 0.001   0.592 -0.374 0.003 0.001 0.786    0.741 
This table reports the results of the regression analysis for the difference score model (equation (2) - the constrained equation) and its 
corresponding unconstrained version (equation (4).  
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For columns labeled (X-Y), X, and Y, values represent unstandardized regression coefficients from equations in which X is the actual FFO, Y is 
the expected FFO and the dependent variable (CAT) is the cumulative abnormal trading volume around the announcement date. The column Fc 
presents the F-ratios for the test of the constraints imposed by the algebraic difference score (the constrained equation), which is equivalent to the 
test of the difference in R2 values for the constrained and unconstrained equations (df 1, N-3). The column labeled FH presents F-ratios for the test 
of higher order terms in a quadratic equation i.e X2, XY and Y2 (d.f 3, N-5). CAT7, CAT5, and CAT3 are the 7 day, 5 day and 3 day cumulative 
abnormal returns respectively.
 
 
*** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 1% level. 
 ** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 5% level 
* indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 10% level 
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Table 14: The Constrained Piecewise Linear Regression estimates of the association between FFO 
surprises and cumulative abnormal trading volume: 1997 -1999 
 
 
 
X - Y 
 
(X –Y)Z 
 
R2 
 
Adj. R2 
CAT 7 0.140 -1.135 0.000 -0.002 
CAT 5 1.322 -1.086 0.001 -0.002 
CAT 3 0.928 -0.481 0.001 -0.001 
This table reports the results of the regression analysis for the difference score combined with piecewise regression model (equation (5).  
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Columns labeled (X-Y) and(X-Y)Z are unstandardized regression coefficients where X is the actual FFO, Y is the expected FFO and Z is an indicator variable set to 0 
for positive surprises/no surprise but 1 for negative surprises .The dependent variable (CAT) is the cumulative abnormal trading volume around the announcement 
date. 
*** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 1% level. 
 ** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 5% level 
* indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 10% level 
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Table 15: Unconstrained Polynomial Regression estimates of the association between FFO surprises 
and cumulative abnormal trading volume: 1997-1999 
       
X 
     
 Y 
   
 X 2  
    
XY 
    
Y 2
   
 
    
R2 
 
Adj. R2 
CAT7 -0.475 1.195 4.520 -16.243 11.870 0.007 0.001 
CAT5 0.731 -0.351 3.680 -15.144 11.310 0.004 -0.002 
CAT3 0.554 -0.304 1.158 -8.633 7.441 0.005 -0.001 
This table reports the results of the regression analysis for the unconstrained polynomial regression (equation 6).  
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For columns labeled X, Y, X2, XY and Y2 values represent unstandardized regression coefficients from equations in which X is the actual FFO, Y 
is the expected FFO and the dependent variable (CAT) is the cumulative abnormal trading volume around the announcement date. CAT7, CAT5, 
and CAT3 are the 7 day, 5 day and 3 day cumulative abnormal trading volume respectively.
 
*** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 1% level. 
 ** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 5% level 
* indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 10% level 
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Table 16: OLS regression estimates of the association between institutional ownership and 
abnormal trading volume: 1997-1999   
Variable  Coefficient 
Constant     -0.750** 
Absolute abnormal return       0.103*** 
Price       0.308** 
Size       -0.074 
Institutional ownership        0.145 
Adjusted R2       0.048*** 
This table reports the results of the regression analysis testing for the impact of institutional investors on abnormal trading volume around the 
announcement of FFO. The dependent variable is the 5 day cumulative abnormal trading volume and is defined as the difference between log 
turnover and average turnover over an estimation period of 30 days ending 11 days prior to the event.  
 
*** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 1% level. 
 ** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 5% level 
* indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 10% level 
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Table 17: OLS regression estimates of association between institutional ownership type and 
abnormal trading volume: 1997-1999 
Variable  Coefficient 
Constant          -0.766** 
Absolute abnormal return           0.102*** 
Price           0.347* 
Size          -0.093 
Mutual funds/investment advisors (IOM)          0.048 
Other Institutions (IOA)          0.293 
Adjusted R2          0.049*** 
This table reports the results of the regression analysis testing for the impact of informed traders on abnormal trading volume around the 
announcement of FFO using two broad classifications of  institutional investors: mutual funds and investment advisors in one group and all others 
in another. The dependent variable is the 5 day cumulative abnormal trading volume.  
 
*** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 1% level. 
 ** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 5% level 
* indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 10% level 
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Table 18: OLS regression estimates of association between institutional ownership type and 
abnormal trading volume after controlling for shifts in ownership patterns: 1997 – 1999  
Variable  Coefficient 
Constant          -0.398 
Absolute abnormal return           0.100*** 
Price           0.389*** 
Size         - 0.125** 
Dummy 99          0.015 
Mutual funds/investment advisors (IOM)         -0.134 
IOM/Dummy99          1.302 
Others (IOA)          1.574*** 
IOA/Dummy99          1.340** 
Adjusted R2          0.051*** 
This table reports the results of the regression analysis testing for the impact of informed traders on abnormal trading volume around the 
announcement of FFO using four classifications on institutional investors. The dependent variable is the 5 day cumulative abnormal trading 
volume and is defined as the difference between log turnover and average turnover over an estimation period of 30 days ending 11 days prior to 
the event.  
 
*** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 1% level. 
 ** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 5% level 
* indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 10% level 
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Table 19: OLS estimates of the relation between dispersion in analysts’ forecast and abnormal 
trading volume: 2004 – 2006 
Variable  Coefficient 
Constant                            -0.734 
Absolute abnormal returns  0.085*** 
Price  0.159*** 
Size                             0.024 
Dispersion in analysts’ forecast  1.985*** 
Adjusted R2                            0.074*** 
This table reports the results of the regression analysis testing for the impact of dispersion in analysts’ forecast on abnormal trading volume 
around the announcement of FFO. The dependent variable is the 5 day cumulative abnormal trading volume is defined as difference between log 
turnover and average turnover over an estimation period of 30 days ending 11 days prior to the event.  
 
*** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 1% level. 
 ** indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 5% level 
* indicates statistical significance based on a two-tailed test at the 10% level 
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Figure 1: A graph showing how abnormal trading volume relates to actual and expected FFO in a 
three-dimension space 
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Figure 2: Graph showing the effect of price (transaction cost) on the relation between abnormal 
trading volume and the level of institutional ownership 
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Figure 3: Institutional Ownership 2004 -2006 
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Figure 4: Institutional Ownership: 1997-1999 
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